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Abstract 
The European Court of Justice was established in 1951, with the purpose of 
interpretating the Treaty of Rome. Since then, the Court has constantly refined 
and expanded its parameters, thereby becoming an important catalyst for the 
integrational process of the European Community, expanding and pushing 
integration forward in every field of Community life. The Court´s case law is a 
manifestation of its creative and extensive interpretation of the Treaty of Rome 
and has created two of the most influential legal concepts within the history of the 
Community, the doctrine of direct effect and the notion of supremacy. It is a fact 
that without these two tools the integrational process of the Community would not 
have developed into what it is today. 
This paper examines the progressive and influential work of the Court, and the 
effects of this work as part of the ongoing process of European integration. It 
describes the structure of the Court, and the role and purpose of the Court as an 
actor within the Community, defines the concepts of integration and integration 
through law in an European context, and finally points out some of the most 
important decisions of the Court and what these decisions have done for the 
integrational process of the European Community. 
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1 Introduction 
The European Union is a regional cooperation between sovereign states. Just like 
a parliamentary nation-state it has a legislative, an executive and a judicial body, 
all according to Montesquieu´s theory of separation of power. The European 
Court of Justice is the judicial body of the EU.  
The EU has three golden rules of law for its members to follow. These are the 
rules of direct effect, supremacy and preliminary ruling
1
. These rules are the most 
important rules of the EU law structure and they make the European Court of 
Justice one of the most influential institutions of the Union, despite the fact that it 
is a non-political institution. Without these sets of rules the Union and the work it 
performs would not be possible. There would be no meaning in proclaiming 
common rules and directives if the member states did not have the incentive to 
comply to the rules proclaimed. The Court has done much for European 
integration, despite the fact that it has been argued that the integration of Europe 
is a political and economical process, instigated and driven by political and 
economical institutions
2
. Contrary to this theory, it is my opinion that the 
Community uses law as a promotion for integration on many levels. Law is the 
tool in the process of creating the internal market, the Euro-zone, the deregulation 
of different markets such as electricity and telecommunication, and it is used to 
create one system of rules for all the member states with the purpose of creating 
equal opportunities for the citizens of the Union. 
The European Court of Justice can, and should, be seen as a catalyst for the 
integrational project of the Community. The Court´s work throughout the years 
has been significant and played an important role in pushing the European 
integration forward to what we see and consider as self-evident today. 
 
I intend to argue that the integrational process of the Union would not have been 
the same without the extensive interpretations of the Treaty by the Court, and its 
controversial but yet accepted judgements. I will not stretch the argument as far as 
to say that the European integrational process would not have been at all without 
the Court, but I would like to point out that it would not have reached into all the 
different spheres of Community life the way it has without the Court. I intend to 
perform this task by showing the character of the Court as an actor and as a 
transforming and affecting structure. 
First I will describe the structure of the Court and how it works. After that I 
will discuss the subject of integration and the theory of integration through law 
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before I will turn to the main question of this paper: in what way has the Court 
been an integrational catalyst? 
I intend to show in what way and why the Court has been, and still is, an 
important actor, and in doing this I will point out the most important decisions of 
the Court and what these decisions have done for the integrational process. I will 
also point out how the Court has worked as an indicator of the integrational 
process and its progress. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  3 
2 The European Court of Justice 
 
The jurisdiction of the Court was established in article 31 in the ECSC (The 
European Coal and Steel Community) Treaty in 1951. The Court´s role was to 
interpret this treaty and in its task to do this is was given certain powers, which 
included to be able to quash acts from the other institutions, hear appeals, impose 
sanctions and order the Community to pay penalty costs on wrongful acts. But 
how the court was supposed to carry out these tasks was not strictly defined in the 
Treaty
3
.  
It was first in 1957, when the Treaty of Rome (henceforth called the Treaty) was 
concluded, that the Court became an institution of the Union
4
. The Court´s 
primary mission is to make sure that the practise of Community law is uniform 
and it does this through extensive dialogue with the lower courts
5
. 
Since then the Court has expanded its work and interpreted the Treaty in 
extensive and sometimes very creative manners. This process has progressively 
developed the Community law into a strong instrument, and has also given the 
Court an extensive case law to base its decisions upon. Of course, at the same 
time, the work load of the Court have increased and this became a problem in the 
1970s, when a pending request from any member state´s court to the Court took 
six months to answer and a pending case took over nine months to be dealt with. 
In 1988 those figures had risen to eighteen months and twenty-four months 
respectively. It was obvious that the structure of the Court had not been created to 
take on such a heavy workload and that something had to be done. The 
effectiveness of the Court and the high requirement on the investigations of the 
Court was at stake. The situation could easily become a serious problem, and a 
threat to the Union structure, if the member states no longer trusted this institution 
do deliver fair and unbiased judgement. The work of creating a better system was 
not concluded until 1988 and the ratification of the Single European Act, in which 
the Court of First Instance (CFI) was created to relieve pressure on the Court
6
. 
In the Maastricht Treaty the member states have shown their interest in 
hindering the supranational institutions of the Community to be involved as equal 
parties in the Community work by weakening their power in the field of justice 
and home affairs and in the field of foreign and security policy
7
. This could be 
seen as an action from the member states to take back some of the power that the 
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Court, by itself, interpreted itself to have. The member states have, by their 
decision in the Maastricht Treaty, slowed down the progressive nature of the 
Court, and in doing this also slowed down the integrational process. This is of 
course a reaction to previous years, when the Court´s decisions have been very 
influential and the Court was in the middle of the creation of a united Europe. 
The treaty of Amsterdam from 1999 changed the disposition of possible 
influence the Court could have on the integrational process even further by 
making it impossible for the lower national courts to ask the Court for a 
preliminary ruling in cases covered by the Amsterdam Treaty
8
. 
2.1 The Court as a structure 
The Court is an international judicial body, but in many ways it shares more 
attributes with constitutional courts than with the International Court of Justice.  
The Court has a lot more power than any other international judicial organization 
due to the member states´ common will to give up parts of their sovereignty to the 
Community. This means that in many cases the power and possibilities of the 
Court are much more like those of a national court than those of an international 
character. This gives the Court a strong position in the institutional framework 
and this is also one of the reasons why the Court has been so effective in pushing 
the European integrational process forward
9
. 
The obligatory jurisdiction of the Court can be mentioned as one of the facts 
that has made its work possible. The member states accept the authority of the 
Court when they become a member. The competence of the Court is also 
exclusive and forbids the member states to resort to any other jurisdiction
10
. 
These two rules, and the fact that not only does the Court arbitrate between 
member states but individuals can also seek remedy from the Court, makes the 
Court an important and powerful catalyst of integration.  The Court, which at first 
glance seems to be separated from the rest of the Community institutions and their 
work of crating an united Europe, is in fact in the middle of it all, pulling the 
threads. The Court acts more as a constitutional court, supervising the member 
states´ and the other EU-institutions´ complacence with community law and 
makes sure that any infringements get corrected
11
. 
 
The Court owes a large part in its development to Article 234 in the Treaty of 
Rome, which makes it possible for the Court to have a dialogue with all the 
national courts in the Community. The rule of preliminary ruling symbolizes one 
of the fundamental thoughts behind the entire community building idea and 
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stresses the importance of integration. At the same time as it places the Court at 
the top of the judicial hierarchy in the Community, it also, in an obvious way, 
makes it possible for all the national courts to connect with the system of 
Community law
12
. The use of this provision had a slow start but today it is the 
most frequently used procedure established by the Treaty of Rome. The use of 
this provision has made national courts more susceptible to Community law and 
the rulings of the Court, since the national courts have the possibility to develop 
and influence the Courts jurisprudence. This procedure makes the boundary 
between national law and jurisdiction and Community law and jurisdiction almost 
seamless. Many of the features of Community law have been shaped by the 
possibility the Court has given individuals, through its interpretation of the 
Treaty, to seek remedy for member states´ Community law infringements
13
. 
The Court´s judges are chosen by the member states and there is one judge for 
every member state. It can be argued that the way the judges are chosen could 
hamper the autonomy of the Court and directly harm its legitimacy and  role as an 
independent arbitrator. The judges, just like the commissioners in the 
Commission, can feel pressured to make political stands that their national 
governments demand under the implicated threat that otherwise they will not be 
re-elected. To hinder this unwanted pressure on the judge there are several rules to 
guarantee voting anonymity and that the judges´ deliberations are secret. There is 
also an unwritten rule that prevents the possibility of a judge ruling in a case from 
her or his own country. All these rules have but one goal and that is to prevent 
politics from infiltrating the legislative process
14
. To the member states´ defence, 
it should be mentioned that no abuse of the appointment power has been noticed, 
despite the fact that the Court has made some very controversial rulings
15
. 
 
The Court´s structure and its role as an actor within the Community differs greatly 
from other judicial organs within the sphere of international law. The Court has 
two more categories of actors to consider compared to other international judicial 
organizations, who as a rule only has states´ rights and obligations in mind when 
implementing and interpreting Community law. The Court must also consider 
other institutions of the Community and individuals. This has made its mark on 
the structure of the Court and its work. Therefore the legal integration of the 
Community could in large be contributed to the Court and its work, and how the 
other actors of the structure have reacted to the Court´s decisions
16
. 
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2.2 The Court as an actor 
The Court works as a trustee rather than an agent and this is one reason why the 
Court has been allowed the amount of discretionary power it has drawn from the 
Treaty without any protests from the member states. The role of a trustee is seen as 
a more reliable actor, since it cannot be controlled by neither the member states nor 
by the institutions on the supranational level
17
. 
The Court in itself originally has a weak legal base considering the statute it 
draws its power from, the Treaty. The Treaty in itself did not follow a debate on 
how an integrated Europe would look like and be governed, it was inspired by 
functionalistic strategies on how certain goals could be achieved in ways that would 
suit most parties involved. The Court has interpreted and constructed its own 
jurisprudence from this document and given itself the role of an innovator, an 
explorer, a role unparalleled within national and international judicial organs
18
. The 
Court´s work to constitutionalize the Treaty made it possible for the Court to be the 
important actor it turned out to be. Since most of the work done within the 
Community, between the different actors, is bargaining, dispute settlements and 
reconciliation, the role of the Court as a centre for all this action comes natural
19
. 
One unavoidable question is: why do member states comply with the rulings of 
the Court? It is a fact that the Court´s decisions have not, in the past, and probably 
will not, in the future, satisfy all parties, and that many of its rulings have been 
controversial and not always embraced by all states, but yet every member state has 
followed the rulings of the Court. One answer to this could be that it is very difficult 
to change a verdict of the Court. This can only be done by treaty amendment, which 
demands unanimity among the member states. But the member states do not have to 
be as drastic as that to hinder the Court. The members could have stopped following 
and complying with the rulings, appointed judges that were more sensitive to states´ 
wishes, or reduced the influence of the Court by political means, and yet they have 
not. The jurisprudence of the Court did not become questioned and criticised until 
the mid 1980s. Up until then the Court seems to have built up a capital of trust and 
legitimacy that national courts, member states and Community institutions 
accepted
20
. The Court has an authority that other institutions within the Union lack. 
The judges of the Court interprets and applies rules in order to clear and resolve 
disputes. This can be done through the Court´s unique knowledge and its unbiased 
opinion and judgements
21
. 
 
Furthermore, it would seem as contradicting actions by the member states to 
dedicate so much power in the Treaty to a Community institution that could hamper 
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and diminish their autonomy, and then not complying with said institution´s 
decisions. Another possible answer to the question of compliance is that all the 
individual member states have an interest in an independent judicial organ that 
upholds Community law and ensures complacence by all members. The Court is the 
incentive for the member states to comply with and carry out the decisions made by 
the Community, even if these decisions once a while contradict their own national 
interests
22
. 
The Court is not perceived, neither by member states nor by the population of 
Europe, as much an actor of the Community as the rest of the institutions since the 
opinion of a judicial organ is that it only hands out judicial rulings and has nothing 
or very little to do with politics. However, the idea of separating law from politics 
could be deceiving when it comes to the interconnected systems of the Union. In the 
Court´s case, law and politics are two sides of the same coin, and in the 
multilayered system of the Union, the Court and the other actors has to consider 
both of these sides to keep legitimacy in their actions. 
 
Through its effectiveness, and the interconnectedness with national courts, the 
Court has upheld its legitimacy and thus avoided criticisms to a large extent. The 
communication between the Court and the national courts have given the national 
courts the possibility to affect Community law and to be a part of the bigger picture, 
a sociological factor that in many cases may have mitigated their criticism of the 
Court´s supremacy. Also, the role of the Court as a mediator between conflicting 
interests, and its aspiration to avoid unneccessary conflicts, has worked to preserve 
its role as an independent actor and thereby preserved its legitimacy
23
. 
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3 Integration 
The term integration can be given different meanings due to its context. Among 
other things, it means a cultural exchange, to be able to benefit from other cultural 
groups´ advantages, and to create something new but yet, to all parties, familiar. 
Integration is when different cultural aspects from two different groups can be 
seen in both groups. The groups have traded different cultural traditions and 
manifestations with each other and in doing this they have become more similar 
without either of them becoming more dominant than the other
24
. 
3.1 Integration and the EU 
In the case of the European Union, the word integration has become synonymous 
with economic integration. But the integrational process of the Union has spread 
from the economic sphere and now involves many different areas, such as 
environmental regulations, University grades and the size of strawberries. None of 
these examples seem to have anything to do with economical integration. 
In this paper, the term integration means foremost the interconnectedness 
between the different institutions on the different levels of the Union. It means the 
process in which the institutions connect and create linkages within the structure 
of the system. This can be done in many different ways and the perfect interaction 
would mean that all parts of Community life, in all member states, are integrated 
and linked to each other through the different institutions. This integrational 
process can work in two different directions: vertical and horizontal. Vertical 
integration means that the actors at the different levels of the Union are connected 
and interact with each other, both at Community level and at member state level. 
Horizontal integration is when actors on the same level interact and connect with 
each other, member state to member state or the Parliament to the Commission
25
. 
Both of these structures are needed for integration to be balanced and fruitful. 
Talking about European integration, one can not neglect the two different 
phases of integration that has occurred: negative integration and positive 
integration. Negative integration means to reduce sovereignity among the member 
states, positive integration means to give the Community more power. In practical 
terms, this gives negative integration the role of removing barriers that hinder the 
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four freedoms (free movement of goods, services, persons and capital) and 
positive integration means to create legal policies to regulate EU matters
26
.  
3.2 Integration through law 
Integration through law is a theory of integration. This theory considers law as 
something more than only rules to prevent or create certain behaviours. It sees law 
as a connecting tool between its subjects. The meaning of law is not only ‘dos’ 
and ‘don´ts’, the law is also a bearer of values. It is a tool which connects and 
divides, and it defines cultural boundaries as well as legal
27
. When Hass points 
out that integration will start in one area and then by means of interconnectedness 
spill over to other areas which are linked together by something these areas have 
in common, he, without telling us what this `something in common´ is, describes 
law as this interconnecting tool
28
. 
Rules and regulations are the tools, but what are these rules and regulations? 
They do not come into existence by themselves and they have to be implemented 
to have their intended impact. Rules and regulations are created by the political 
institutions that govern the society for which the rules are intended. But the 
political institutions can not both create and implement these laws, not if they 
strive to be looked upon as a democratic society. Therefore these two functions 
are divided between different institutions that are separated from each other to 
ensure that they will have an equal amount of impact on society.  
One problem with theorising around the concepts of law and politics is that we 
might draw false conclusions about their interconnectedness, and try to see them 
as separate entities which can exist by themselves – law as a separate ‘pure’ 
concept, uninfluenced by shifting political agendas. This is simply not true. One 
objective of law is to be a bearer of political information and at the same time 
make the political process easier by creating clear rules for the society to follow. 
There would be no law without politics, and there would be no politics without 
law. Integration is a political subject and at the same time a subject for the rule of 
law to consider. If the law is not rooted in the political sphere, and thereby in the 
minds of its citizens, the law has no meaning and no impact. A law which no one 
admits to is no law; to be an accepted rule most of those ruled must acknowledge 
and admit the rule. 
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3.3 Integration through law in the work of the Court 
Since the EU is a cooperation built upon treaties and the rule of law, much of the 
communication and integration between the member states are through the 
process of law, whether it is for the purpose of creating new Community law or to 
implement the already commonly decided rules. Most of the work within the EU 
is strictly according to rules and regulations, and through these rules the member 
states are integrated in the supranational structure of  the EU. The Court´s primary 
function is to make sure that the other institutions, and the member states, comply 
to the rules set out in the different treaties
29
. The Court has the power to make 
sure that the rules created by the member states, through the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament, are implemented in the right way. The right way in 
this case means that the rules shall be interpreted in the way the treaties intend 
them to be, and by doing this the will of the member states is respected and 
carried out. 
 
The Court is a judicial body, but its decisions and rulings have political effects. 
All of the principles mentioned above are, at the core, legal aspects, but they also 
have layer upon layer of political and cultural make-up. The problem the theory of 
integration through law in a European context is facing is not in the respect of 
normativity but in the respect of identification. It has been said that national law 
has a richer cultural context for the citizens to identify with than the Community 
law
30
. The Court´s work is to connect all the different national legal systems of 
the Community to one uniform unity of Community law.  
The work of the Court is much like the work of a constitutional court. The 
member states have already agreed on the rules, and the Court is only carrying out 
their will through its interpretation. This could lead to the argument that the Court 
does not really have an important role to play in the integrational process, but that 
is too hasty an assumption to make. The development of European integration can 
in many cases be contributed to the work of the Court and its judgements, since 
much of the progress within the area of free movement of goods stemmed from 
the Court´s case law rather than from descisions made by the political parts of the 
Community
31
.  
Some integrational theorists
32
 have chosen to see law as a dependent variable 
which reflects rather than creates. These theorists have pointed out that integration 
between states are based on economic and technological factors, not on laws
33
. 
For example, if we look at one of the four freedoms, the free movement of goods, 
it is quite clear that this area benefited more from the Court´s interpretation than 
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from political decisions
34
. If we view the case law of the Court it is difficult to 
regard the rulings of the Court as descendant only from member states´ interests. 
Many of the more influential rulings, such as Les Verts, Van Gend en Loos, and 
Cassis de Dijon, have ruled against powerful members. These cases seem to be 
more inspired by the rule of law than by national interests. But the Court should 
not be seen as a non-affected actor: many of its rulings have considered political 
climate and political debates, both at Community and national levels
35
. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
34 Dehousse, p. 81 
35 ibid, p. 178f 
  12 
4 Interpretation of law 
There is a widespread opinion that judges are passive actors, who only apply the 
law to the cases put before them. In theory this is correct, since in theory all 
judges are rational human beings who, given correct information, will give the 
same ruling for the same sort of case every time without corrupting the law with 
personal opinions. But in practise this is fiction. The judges interpret the wording 
of the law. The interpreting process in itself is a creative process where the judge 
has to choose between several possible meanings of one rule. These different 
meanings are coloured by the society the judge lives in, and by her or his political 
opinion, to mention only a few possible influences. The judges not only have to 
consider the reason and the background for the law that they are interpreting but 
also what it has developed into and if the meaning of the law has transformed. 
The judges have to regard previous judgements and in what context they where 
made, and if these previous judgements can still be looked upon as valid and a 
good basis for their decisions
36
. 
The next stage of the interpretation process is the outcome of the ruling. By 
giving a ruling in a case the judge is engaging in the law-making procedure. The 
ruling will not only affect the parties involved in this particular case, but will also 
be used in the future as a reference for similar cases
37
. 
4.1 Interpreting the Treaty 
To understand legal integration within the scope of the European Union, one must 
first know the purpose of the Court. This purpose is not only laid down in the 
Treaty but also indicated by the Court itself through its interpretations of the 
Treaty. The most essential work of the Court is to interpret the Treaty and give 
decisions and judgements concerning Community law. The Court seeks to 
intensify the effectiveness of Community law within the national legal order of 
the member states and to accomplish the broader goals of the Treaty by evolving 
the concept of supranational governance
38
. 
Interpretation, in the case of the Court, means reasoning around the provisions 
of the Treaty to find possible decisions that can be justified. In this process the 
Court has to take into account different reasons - legal norms, values, policies and 
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principles - to justify its decision
39
. When the Court interprets the Treaty it also 
has to balance all the different interests of the Treaty and make sure that no 
interest get a disproportional advantage. The interpretation of the Court not only 
has to be internally justified but also externally justified. The judgement must be 
rooted in law and it has to be the right decision, which means it must be 
acceptable ethically, politically and ideologically
40
.  
The Treaty is written as a framework with non-specific provisions, and this not 
only opens up for interpretation by the Court - it demands it. Without the Court´s 
clarifications of the provisions, it would be hard, maybe even impossible, to 
uphold the unanimous practice of Community law and to obtain the meaning of 
the rules intended in the provisions
41
. 
This balance between conflicting interests has in the past lead to extensive 
interpretations and the Court has had the possibility to clarify other goals of the 
Community than strictly economical ones. The environmental goal of the 
Community is one of these interpreted goals, emerging from the required balance 
between conflicting interest in the Danish bottle case, ADBHU case and the 
Wallon waste case
42
. 
 
What should not be forgotten in this process is that the Court only interprets the 
intention of the decision-makers, the member states, in its reading of the Treaty. 
The only tool the Court has in its work to interpret the Treaty is the guiding values 
of the Community: the idea of the integrational process between states that is 
neither a tight federation nor just a loosely structured regional cooperation but a 
Union with a structure and a system that promotes integration in all areas of life
43
. 
The Treaty is the only primary source of law the Court can use, and that is not 
much for the Court to drawn its interpretations from. Therefore the interpretations 
are wide and generalized, very much unlike national courts´ interpretations and 
readings of law. This has to do with the structure of public international law in 
general and with the structure of EC law in particular. This also offers an 
explanation to why the Court has been able to give both creative and extensive 
rulings, thereby pushing the integrational process further. 
4.2 The case law of the Court 
The primary law of the Community is not very dense. It consists of treaties, with 
provisions upon provisions of ‘dos’ and ‘don´ts’, but the provisions themselves 
are not always easy to grasp. Therefore the Community actors developed a dense 
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secondary law catalogue - the case law of the Court. It is a manifest of the actions 
and interactions between different actors on the European and intranational level: 
national courts, lawyers, judges, lobbyists, bureaucrats, politicians, private firms 
and individuals. All these actors are brought together by one common factor: the 
Court. The legal integration-procedure within the Community have facilitated the 
supranational governance and the transnational society of the Union and this has 
been done by the rule-making of the Court
44
. 
 
The integrational process of the European Union can this far be seen as a two-step 
project. These two stages are one political and one legal process, which both 
began in the 1950s and 1960s. The Union started out with the political process 
and the goal of creating a political community, but this idea was abandoned in the 
mid 1950s and due to this the political integration came to a halt. Instead of the 
failed political integration, the legal integrational process took place, driven by 
the European Court of Justice. The Court transformed the Union structure through 
unification and this led to a more federal structure of the institutions. These 
changes are to be seen as results of the actions and decisions of the Court
45
. 
 
The influence of the Court on the integrational process can be divided in to two 
branches: direct and indirect. Direct influence are the rulings and case law of the 
Court, its direct interpretations of the Treaty and its obvious actions. Indirect 
influence are all the different ways in which the Court´s rulings conditions the 
rights and obligations it has interpreted from Treaty provisions. These conditions 
can indicate new areas that has to be explored and clarified, as well as 
legitimating decisions and provoking the Commission to instigate legislature
46
. 
In exercising its indirect influence the Court takes on many different roles. It 
can act as an agenda-setter and a policy-innovator. In several cases (the most 
known being Van Gend en Loos, Continental Can, Cassis de Dijon and Philip 
Morris) it has pointed out problems and tasks of importance that have to be 
addressed. The Court does this through its Treaty-defined right as the sole 
interpreter of the Treaty. Because of its rulings, and the possibility that the rulings 
will alter the relationship between the actors within the Community, it can create 
issues that will have to be considered by the political institutions of the 
Community
47
. 
The Court can also act as an policy innovator and this has most been noted in 
the area of free movement of goods. By concluding that national regulations are 
subjected to Community law as well as the fact that the Treaty is a bearer of rights 
even for individuals and the importance of Community law being uniform, the 
Court has instigated the harmonizing process. By interpreting the Treaty as a non- 
discriminatory set of rules, the Court declared that the area of free movement of 
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goods needed policies to be free and equal between all the member states. The 
Court left the conditions on how these polices should be concluded to the 
Commission to decide but it indicated that polices in this area were needed. In 
making this ‘suggestion’ the Court renovated the integrational process once more 
in a time when it had slowed down. In introducing the concept of mutual 
recognition, which was the outcome of the harmonizing idea, the Court changed 
the structure of the Community and the roles of the different actors
48
. 
In its Treaty interpretation-processes, the Court fills in the gaps left by the 
Commission and by doing this it puts pressure on the member states to consider 
provisions and principles which might extend beyond what single member states 
originally intended. All of the above mentioned decisions have but one goal: to 
motivate the Commission as the legislature of the Community, to make it clear to 
the member states that action is preferable to non-action and to show that 
harmonizing different spheres of Community law will lead to benefits for all
49
. 
 
In its work to integrate the Community and the member states even more the 
Court has pushed the integration within the Community institutions in the same 
direction. The Court made it possible for the Parliament, the Commission and the 
Council to all be able to be counter-parties before the Court. The Treaty already 
gave the Commission and the Council this right, but the Court interpreted the 
provision and the wording ‘institutions’ to involve the Parliament as well. The 
Court extracted the spirit of division of power from the Treaty and saw the 
importance of the elected Parliament to be able to question the decisions of the 
Commission and the Council in their task to make the voice of the people of the 
Union heard. This process took several years (1980-1988) and involved many 
cases (Les Verts and Chernobyl among others) in which the Court carefully and 
thoroughly, step by step, built on its own case law to make the final ruling which 
gave the Parliament the same right to instigate judicial procedures as the other 
institutions of the Community.
50
. 
Since one of the Court´s obligations is to act as an arbitrator between the other 
institutions it is inevitable that it will have an impact in the decision-making 
process. Ever since the Court took its place as an equal among the other 
institutions, the other actors have developed other strategies than the most 
common one, political debate, to reach their goals. Among these strategies the 
most obvious one is going to court
51
. This makes the policy process very 
different. The mere possibility that the political action in question could be 
questioned in front of the Court makes the politicians, member states and 
institutions of the Community more inclined to integrate legal concerns into their 
action programs. The concept of Community law is always present in the political 
decision making
52
. 
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The Court has provided more room for all kinds of political actors within the legal 
sphere. This have shifted the balance between the political actors and the judicial 
actors. More and more important decisions are made by the judiciary and more 
plaintiffs will be tempted to go to court if there is much at stake. All these 
different examples show that the decisions made by the Court cannot be 
considered as only judicial and without political impact. They work as clear 
examples of how well intertwined politics and judicial decision are and show us 
that the Court has a tremendous impact in the integrational process within the 
Community.     
As mentioned and discussed above the integrational work of the Court has 
reached far beyond what the founders of the Union could ever have imagined. 
Through its progressive interpretation of the Treaty, the legal branch of the 
Community has shown the political branch how the integrational process could be 
conducted, and the cooperation between the institutions at Community level has 
created new processes of law making. 
  17 
5 Essential decisions of the Court 
The work of the Court, since it was created through the Treaty, has been nothing 
less than out of the ordinary. The Court has interpreted and treated the Treaty as a 
constitutional charter for the Community and has declared that the Treaty cannot 
be changed, not even by the will of the member states, due to its important 
character and constitutional status, and in deciding this the Court has declared that 
only it can interpret the provisions of the Treaty in the correct way, and create an 
unanimous practise of Community law
53
. The Court has built up a structure of 
constitutional character, which rests on three fundamentally important notions of 
Community law: the doctrine of direct effect, the notion of supremacy and the 
provision of preliminary ruling
54
. Of these core concepts, the doctrine of direct 
effect and the notion of supremacy are results of decisions made by the Court. 
The provision of preliminary ruling is established in Article 234 in the Treaty, and 
will not be examined further in this paper. 
5.1 Direct Effect 
Direct effect is a cornerstone of European Community law. The legality of direct 
effect is not established by any treaty but through a ruling of the Court in the case 
of van Gend en Loos in 1963
55
. The doctrine of direct effect not only applies to 
the Community treaties but to secondary legislation as well
56
. For the national 
courts to use the notion of direct effect the regulation must fulfil three criteria 
(these criteria were established in the case of  Van Duyn v. Home Office in 
1974
57
): the rule that is to have direct effect must be clear and precisely stated, it 
must be unconditional or non-dependent and it must deliberate a certain right for 
individuals to base their claim
58
. The principle of direct effect means that the rules 
are enforceable in all the member states´ national courts, for states as well as for 
individuals. 
In the ruling of van Gend en Loos the Court established the doctrine of direct 
effect by interpreting the Treaty in a non-literal way. Instead, the Court looked to 
the spirit and intent of the parties at the time when the Treaty was concluded. This 
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is a typical example of the extensive interpretation that the Court has conducted in 
earlier years, as mentioned above. In this interpretation the Court explained and 
tried to grasp the intentions of the Community and the entire regional cooperation. 
The Court took a side for the integrational process and pointed out that for this 
cooperation to work as it was intended, the rules and regulations within this 
cooperation had to be more alike and interlocked than they had turned out to be. 
In this case, the Court took the opposite side of the politicians and most of the 
member states on a subject that was considered to be highly political and not the 
slightest judicial: integration
59
. 
In practical terms Community law instigated by for example the Council, is to 
be considered the law of all the member states with effect immediately. This was 
the interpretation of the Court in the case of van Gend en Loos. The Court 
interpreted the treaty of Rome: 
 
“...the Community constitutes a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which the states have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields and 
the subjects of which comprise not only member states but 
also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of 
member states, community law therefore not only imposes 
obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon 
them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These 
rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the 
treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the treaty 
imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as 
upon the member states and upon the institutions of the 
community.”
60
 
 
By this ruling the Court not only interpreted and established the principle of direct 
effect, but also gave individuals new and never before seen rights on an 
international level. The Court established that individuals could hold their 
countries accountable for decisions and commitments they had made to other 
states through the Community treaties
61
. 
At the time of the ruling the European Parliament was not directly elected, and 
the nationals of the different member states were much further away from the 
centers of power within the Community than today. The political climate was 
harder, and the possibilities for nationals of member states to make their voices 
heard within the Community bureaucracy were fewer. The thought of the 
integrational process within the Community had not yet been spoken of, but the 
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action of the Court showed how much it was inspired by the spirit of the Treaty 
and the thought of an united European Community
62
. 
The doctrine of direct effect gave the nationals of the different member states 
the role of guardians of the integrity within the Community system. By doing this 
the Court changed the dynamics of the integrational process, thereby contributing 
greatly to the effectiveness of the Community system. The slow and bureaucratic 
days of the Community met an end, since now the institutions and member states 
had to consider the nationals as a new player in the game
63
. 
5.2 Supremacy 
The next core concept of Community law is the principle of supremacy
64
. 
Together with the doctrine of direct effect this principle builds the core of 
Community law and gives the Court its important position in relation to the 
national courts of the member states
65
. The rule of supremacy guarantees that the 
doctrine of direct effect has its intended effect: to make Community law uniform 
and effective. As in the case of the doctrine of direct effect, the principle of 
supremacy is not mentioned in any treaty
66
. The Court has in several cases ruled 
that Community law is to bee seen as superior to the individual member states´ 
national laws. This means that whenever a conflict arises between national law 
and Community law, the Community law has precedence over national law. This 
principle emerged in the case of Costa v. ENEL in 1964
67
. 
 
“The integration into the laws of each member state of 
provisions which derive from the Community and more 
generally the terms and the spirit of the treaty, make it 
impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord precedence 
to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system 
accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. Such a measure 
cannot therefore not be inconsistent with that legal system. 
The law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of 
law, could not because of its special and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, 
without being deprived of its character as community law and 
without the legal basis of the community itself being called 
into question.”
68
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By this ruling, the Court established that the member states had a duty to give 
Community law precedence over national law as a consequence of their 
commitment to the Community and its members. The principle of supremacy also 
reserves for the Court the right to declare any Community law invalid, which 
makes the Court not only ruler of the land but the highest ruler of the land
69
. The 
Court motivated its interpretation with the fact that Community law could, and 
cannot, be different in the different member states. The Court stated that this 
would be to go against the Treaty and the very ideal of the Community idea. The 
meaning and the possibility of an existing and functional Community demanded 
that Community law was seen as supreme to national legislation. The rule of 
supremacy, declared the Court, is essential for the survival of a unified 
cooperation and just as important to the legal security, legitimacy and democracy 
of this cooperation
70
. By the Court´s decision, the rule of supremacy made 
Community law absolute over all national provisions, even constitutional 
provisions, and again the Court provided a constitutional character to the Treaty.  
The Court went even further, and made it clear that the integrational thought in 
the Treaty had to be regarded as one of the fundamental ideas of the Community, 
and that the process of harmonizing the Community and its member states´ 
different laws by creating Community law should not be stopped, or even 
hampered, by the unwillingness of some states to fulfil their obligations in time
71
. 
 
In practise this means that the member states have given up part of their national 
sovereignty to the Court. It means that every member states´ national judicial 
system is subjected to the ruling of the Court, and that community law is to be 
complied with, without exception, as if it was national law. It also means that the 
member states have relinquished normative power in those areas where 
Community law is present, and therefore cannot create new laws in these areas
72
. 
 
5.3 Direct effect and supremacy at work 
It is necessary to once more point out that without the doctrine of direct effect and 
the notion of supremacy, the case law of the Court, the Court´s influential work 
and its role as an integrational catalyst would never have come to be. I would like 
to argue that the doctrine of direct effect and the notion of supremacy are the 
necessary tools the Court needs to be able to do its work: to interpret the Treaty 
and make sure the Community evolves into what its founders intended it to be. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
69 Wiener, Diez, p. 185 
70 Dehousse, p. 42 
71 ibid, p. 39 
72 Melin, Schäder, p. 45f 
  21 
With these tools the Court has been able to interpret and constitutionalize the 
Treaty, not only to be a legal document binding certain states together, but to 
crystallize and point out the rights and responsibilities all the actors in the 
European arena have towards each other. In this part of the paper I will point out 
two examples where these two crucial concepts have been necessary for the 
integrational progress of Community law. 
 
The notion of supremacy and the doctrine of direct effect were established in the 
first period of the integrational process, and they are necessary conditions to make 
law, and the rule of law within the Community, reliable. These two concepts were 
also the tools needed to create the common market and they are still needed to 
keep the market afloat. These concepts were also crucial when the Court 
developed the concept of mutual recognition in the second period of the 
integrational process of the Community
73
. This far most of the Court´s work has 
been concerning the four freedoms, but there are other goals of the Community 
where the Court´s work has been, and will be, very influential, and where the 
concepts of direct effect and supremacy are necessary: environmental protection 
and respect for human rights. 
     The Treaty is silent on both the idea of environmental protection and the 
question of human rights-issues. But, as has been mentioned above, the Court has 
in its most important and influential rulings interpreted the Treaty to hold rights 
and ideas beyond the literal text. The Court has placed the Treaty in a Community 
context and has, through this, been able to see Community goals that have not 
been clearly declared by the member states
74
. Again, these extensive 
interpretations of the Treaty would not have been possible without the Court´s 
earlier work, the forming of the doctrine of direct effect and the notion of 
supremacy. 
 
The Treaty original does not mention human rights and its purpose was primarily 
to create a common market, but through the Court´s interpretation the Treaty has 
also become a charter of rights. This process started in the late 1950s but it was 
not until the late 1980s that the Court began to point out acts by member states 
that could be considered violations of rights. 
     Due to the fact that the Treaty is silent on the matter, the Court´s first decision 
had to be whereas it actually had jurisdiction or not in this field. This was done 
through several cases where the Court used the European Charter of Human 
Rights (ECHR) to establish which rights the member states of the Community 
considered to be fundamental. The Court reasoned that since all members of the 
Community also were parties to ECHR, they had recognised and agreed that these 
rights should be respected. They also referred to these rights as fundamental in 
other obligations towards each other, and since the Court had concluded, in the 
Warchauf case, that one of the Community goals was to respect fundamental 
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rights, the Court, by analogical interpretation, was able to transfer the rights 
catalogue from the ECHR to the Treaty
75
. This was possible since the Court 
established that the recognised rights in ECHR already were recognised by the 
member states in their constitutions. By this decision the Court pointed out that 
there has to be a balance between the rights of governments and the rights of 
private actors, firms and individuals. There are certain values that cannot and 
should not be compromised by the the endeavour to create a common market.  
The Court´s decision was fully accepted by the member states and ratified by 
the other institutions of the Community in 1977, when the Parliament, the 
Commission and the Council jointly recognised the capacity of the Court as able 
to guarantee the fundamental rights of the Community, since these rights were 
established in the constitutions of all the Community members through the 
ECHR
76
. In the late 1980s there were two cases, Solange I and II, that ruled that 
as long as the Court has the possibility to effectively protect the fundamental 
rights of the Community, it should be allowed to do so
77
. 
Since then, in 2004, the member states have decided upon a common charter for 
the Community which specifies the fundamental human rights within the 
Community. This charter was motivated by the the member states on the ground 
that a precise legal status for the rights was needed and that a codification of the 
rights already used by the Court was needed to give these rights the proper 
attention. This is a good example of how progressive the work of the Court has 
been. The Court interpreted the Treaty, and thereby the intentions of the member 
states, to build a case law that the member states later codified and made into 
Community law
78
. 
 
The very same process can be seen in the way the concept of environmental 
protection became a fundamental goal for all the member states of the EU. Prior 
to the SEA, the Community had no provisions on environmental protection or 
even any written text stating that the protection of the environment was an 
objective of the Community. The treaty did not mention environmental protection 
as a goal of the Community and it definitely did not state that the Court had any 
competence in making decisions and rulings in this particular area of Community 
law. But still the Court made a decision in the ADBHU case in 1983, proclaiming 
that the protection of the environment is one of the central objectives of the 
Community
79
. Once again, the Court decided that it had jurisdiction, and then 
went on to make a binding decision stating, again, that there are certain values 
that cannot and should not be compromised, not even by the all-important 
economic goals of the Union. 
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6 The changing role of the Court 
Since the mid-1980s the work of the Court has changed, and it has even been said 
that the Court´s most influential period is over. The change in the Court´s 
behaviour can be seen in the transformation of its functions and in its 
environment. Since the completion of the SEA in 1992 new areas of friction and 
tension between the system actors have emerged, and the Court has found itself, 
as a mitigator, in the midst of these
80
. 
There could be several reasons for this change. One might be that the 
integrational process by now has reached so far that much of daily life in the EU 
is affected by Community law. Community law is not only seen in the economical 
life of the Community, in the free movement of goods and in the monetary union, 
but also through the other freedoms and fundamental values of the EU, such as 
respect for human rights and deregulations of differing markets and health 
regulations. This development, which has been pushed forward by the extensive 
influence of the Court´s interpretations of the Treaty, has put more focus on the 
Court than before and have created changes in the behaviour of the member states 
in relationship to the Court
81
. This new focus could have formed a more 
conservative attitude within the Court, influencing it to make decisions with 
concern to avoid being put in the spotlight by the other actors of the Community. 
The Maastricht Treaty could be another reason why the Court has entered into a 
more conservative period. One could say that the restrictions imposed on the 
Court through the Maastricht Treaty came as a natural reaction to the Court´s 
earlier extensive interpretations. The Court´s influence on the Community and  its 
policy processes had changed the course of integration into something that the 
member states had not anticipated and it is actually quite remarkable how long 
those member states sat by and accepted the Court´s involvement in most policy 
procedures within the Community. Through the Maastricht treaty the member 
states have excluded whole areas from the jurisdiction of the Court, and by this 
made it clear that they will not tolerate more extensive interpretation and 
implementing of the spirit of the Treaty to push the integrational process forward. 
The areas excluded belong to the third pillar of the Union and are usually seen as 
core states matter. The Maastricht treaty has been amended several times to give 
clarifications on certain provisions intended to curtail the power of the Court´s 
rulings
82
. The message to the Court is clear: the member states do need the Court, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
80 Stone Sweet, p. 155 
81 Dehousse, p. 176 
82 ibid, p. 164 
  24 
and want it to perform its Treaty obligations, but they do not wish to have one 
more actor to deal with in the policy making process
83
. 
 
Is the Court´s ‘retirement’ then something that should be considered a sign of the 
European integrational process slowing down? The expansion of Community 
activities and the areas where Community law has interfered with national law has 
increased drastically since the mid-1980s, about the same time that the Court 
started choosing a more conservative position. This has not happened by chance. 
The more integrated the Community has become, the more harsh voices of lost 
national sovereignty have been heard. Since the Community is a framework built 
by and of rules and regulations, and since many of the integrating decisions have 
been made by the Court, it is quite obvious that the member states reacted, and 
saw the Court as the cause of many of these changes. The result was the curtailing 
of the Court´s power in the Maastricht Treaty.
84
 
So one could argue that the Court has lost power, since in fact it has due to the 
changes in the later treaties, but maybe a more precise argument would be that the 
focus of the Court has shifted. Up until the mid-1980s most of the work within the 
Community was concentrated on regulating the common market, to make the idea 
of the four freedoms a reality. Now, when the common market is a fact, with the 
neccessary regulations in the field of movement of goods and trade in place, focus 
has shifted to other areas of the Community, areas that has not yet been under 
consideration, for example human rights issues and environmental protection. 
Since these subjects are not on the top of the agenda for most private or 
governmental actors, the directly notable influence of the Court may have shrunk, 
but this is only a fact from the point of view that issues such as these do not have 
top priority. The changed behaviour of the Court should not be interpreted as a 
weakening of the Court´s influential power: it should be seen as a sign of changes 
in the Community system as a whole, rather than in any particular institution. 
What also must be considered is that the Court´s attention has been drawn away 
from its work as in interpreter of Community law, to its role as an implementer of 
Community law. The number of infringements have increased at the same time as 
the number of Community rules has increased. The Court´s work of today more 
and more looks like the work of a national court
85
. 
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7 Conclusion 
The legal system is the backbone of integration within the Community, and not 
giving the Court the credit for the pace and involvement of the integrational 
process would be denying this fact. Today Community law is as often enforced on 
a national level as on a Community level, and national bureaucracy implements 
Community law as often as Community bureaucracy does
86
. 
Through the doctrine of direct effect and the notion of supremacy, together with 
the provision of preliminary ruling, the Court has made itself and the national 
courts important actors within the Community structure and made legislature the 
main tool to push the unification of the member states to new and unexplored 
levels
87
. In announcing the the doctrine of direct effect and the notion of 
supremacy the Court opened the European legal system to private parties, and in 
doing this enhanced the legal influence and the implementation of Community 
law. Community law became important to all actors, no matter on which level 
they were working
88
. Private actors started to fuel the system with cases that 
concerned their personal areas of interest, and began working as watchdogs for 
the Community, motivated by their own economical interests. Thus, the legal 
institutions within the Community, both at EC level and at member state level, 
produced network effects that spread from one corner of the community to the 
other. This is the macro effect of the decisions and judgements made by the 
Court
89
. 
 
Most often, when integration and the integrational processes of the Union are 
mentioned, it is in a strictly political and economical context. At least that is how 
most people have come to think of it. What has to be remembered is that the 
concept of law and the concept of politics can only be separated in theory, and 
cannot be kept apart in practise. To argue that the Court do not engage in the 
policy process of the Community is to ignore the interconnectedness between 
policy-making and legislature. The Court has played a unique and never before 
seen role in the integrational process of international law. It has pushed the use of 
the Treaty of Rome to be seen as a constitutional charter and a bearer of rights for 
both states and individuals. By its interpretation of the Treaty, its case law has 
introduced new policies and pressed for new legislation
90
. It is hard to overlook 
the importance of the Court in the integrational process and it is even harder to 
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overlook the importance of law as an integrational catalyst within the Community. 
The Court has given the institutions of the Community, as well as the individual 
member states, the tools they have needed to perform the tasks necessary to make 
integration within the Community possible. 
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